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As recessionary pressures take effect and public sector services, including the police, attempt to ensure the
services they provide remain effective, efficient and economically viable in times of austerity, reforms to
governance in an effort to increase accountability must be considered as important as any procedural or
structural reform. This article considers the strategic and economic impact of introducing directly elected
Crime Commissioners within England and Wales, in reforms to policing that have been described as the
most radical in decades. Redistributing accountability and reordering the balance of power to create a new
post-tripartite system involving possibly four different interested parties, including Chief Constables, the
Home Secretary, Crime Commissioners and the Commissioner Panels, will undoubtedly have serious
implications for the provision of policing services. Whilst not a panacea for issues surrounding accountability
within policing, the new proposed changes, if implemented correctly and robustly with financial, public and
political support, may have the opportunity to reform the policing landscape by increasing transparency and
re-engaging the police with the different communities across the United Kingdom. In addition to these
positive connotations, potential problems and difficulties have also been discussed throughout this article,
which must be acknowledged and considered carefully if the proposed changes are to have the desired
effect.
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Introduction
The recent publication of the Home Office consultation document 'Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting
the Police and the People' has once again focused the debate around police governance and accountability
(Home Office, 2010a). The government is currently consulting on plans to introduce directly elected Police
and Crime Commissioners, create an independent police and crime panel and introduce a new National
Crime Agency in what has been described as the most radical reforms to policing for at least 50 years. There
seem to be accord and unity amongst the coalition government on these issues, which have featured in a
significant part of the recent general election, appearing in both the conservative and liberal democrats'
manifestos (Conservative Party, 2010). However, whilst there may be a sense of agreement amongst some
MPs from the different political parties, this cannot be said for all agencies, stakeholder groups and
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organisations affected by the proposed changes. Amongst the groups that are most vocal and concerned is
the Association of Police Authorities (APA), who under the proposed plans, it would appear, will no longer
exist (BBC, 2010; Home Office, 2010b; Independent, 2010). This article will explore the options available to
the government by examining the potential advantages and disadvantages associated with both the current
and the proposed new system.
New Era of Economics and Politics
The public are encouraged to engage with public sector organisations and the 'big society' ideology and, if
implemented robustly, this will apparently encourage participation and volunteerism. In doing so, it is
anticipated that empowering communities and decentralising power through rolling back the frontier of the
state will have far-reaching and significant strategic implications for the delivery of policing services to
consumers (Gravelle & Rogers, 2010a). In times of economic unrest, societal change and political
uncertainly, challenges facing the police organisation are significant (Gravelle & Rogers, 2009). Currently
facing a real-terms budget reduction of between 16% and 20% accompanied by significant structural reform,
it will be for the police service to deliver a better service for less (Neyroud, 2010; Davis, 2010).
Perhaps referring to a 'better for less' rather than 'more for less' aspiration for delivering policing services
more accurately encapsulates the task facing all 43 police forces across England and Wales. As society
moves to become more individualistic and consumer-orientated, with neoliberalism and free market forces
dominating, it appears the police service will be reformed to ensure it remains relevant (Shaffer & Kipp,
2009). Accompanying the economic situation, constant structural and procedural changes facing the police
service, for example the fast-approaching Olympic Games being held in the United Kingdom, will further
complicate the policing landscape with many practitioners and commentators suggesting that now is not the
best time to undertake such a radical reform programme (Pritchard, 2009). However, it seems highly likely
that the government will continue its proposed programme of reform in a perceived attempt to ensure
policing remains accountable, effective and a progressive public service.
The Current System
Currently, responsibility for the delivery of all policing services is shared among three different bodies. The
power-sharing responsibilities are divided among the Home Secretary, Police Authority and the Chief
Constable (Wakefield & Fleming, 2009). This arrangement is commonly referred to as the tripartite system
established by the Police Act 1964. Under this system, the Home Secretary is responsible for the overall
efficiency and effectiveness of policing in England and Wales and is accountable directly to Parliament. The
Chief Constable is responsible for all operational policing decisions within the force, controlling with
autonomy over any available resource (Pope & Weiner, 1981). The third and final party involved in policing is
the Police Authority which regulates and holds Chief Constables to account. In addition to this important
duty, the Police Authority sets the strategic direction and budget. The composition of police authorities can
differ; however, in most instances there are 17 elected members (Barrett, 2011). Nine elected members are
from local government and are nominated to the authority. The remaining eight independent members who
are included as part of the authority come from the local community, with a requirement that at least one
independent member is a magistrate. TABLE 1 below sets out in detail the wider role and primary
responsibilities of each of the parties involved in policing within England and Wales.
Criticisms of the Current System
Under this system, one of the current anomalies is that the Home Office, along with other politicians, can
apply significant pressure on Chief Constables to direct resources in particular ways. However, the result of
any such action is solely the responsibility of the Chief Constable and there seems little accountability on
behalf of individual politicians. Another area of concern under the current system is the legitimacy of the
Page 2
Police Authority. Although it is true that members are appointed representatives, the majority of officials that
form the Police Authority have not been directly appointed by the public as representatives of the people on
policing issues. Instead, the majority of officials are elected to local government positions as councillors and
not as a direct consequence of knowledge of policing matters (Wakefield & Fleming, 2009).
Table 1 Role of the tripartite system
Police Authority Chief Constable Home Office
Maintain efficient
force
Responsible for direction and
control
Promote efficiency
Agree budget, re-
sponsible for ex-
penditure
Prepare draft budget, finan-
cial management
Determine grant
Appoint Chief Con-
stable
Control, direct employees Approve appointment of CC
Set local objectives,
consult locally
Adhere to local & national ob-
jectives and targets
Set national objectives, set
performance levels
Issue local policing
plan
Draft local policing plans Receive copy of local policing
plan
Control finances for
extra resources
Operational and resource al-
location control
Can determine levels of per-
formance
The lack of awareness among the public also raises concerns over the legitimacy of police authorities. In a
survey conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2007, only 7% of respondents indicated that if they had an issue
with the delivery of policing services they would know they should contact their local Police Authority (Home
Office, 2010c). In Louise Casey's Crime and Communities Review, 67% of respondents would not know who
to go to if they were unhappy with the delivery of local policing services. Interestingly, only 19% of
respondents in an IPSOS MORI poll stated that the local councillor was the best person to hold the police to
account. Similarly, in a local government inquiry, 48% of respondents mistrust councils whereas only 24%
mistrust the police (Home Office, 2010c). This lack of awareness and apparent lack of transparency has
almost certainly reinforced the argument for introducing directly elected Crime Commissioners (Weitzer,
1995). As the public are mainly unaware of the existence of police authorities, it is highly unlikely that the
public are informed and aware of their role, or who the members are.
There is also a belief that police authorities in their current state often fail to hold Chief Constables to
account. In part, it is believed that the lack of powers and autonomy held by the authority combine to
reinforce the position of the Chief Constable while leaving the authority little option other than to submit to the
operational decisions of the Chief Constable. It would be highly unlikely, unusual and irregular that the Police
Authority would not release the policing budget or precept to chief officers. Overall, there seems to be a
'democratic deficit' surrounding police authorities and, as a result, there has been in recent years growing
concern over public dissuasion and disconnection with policing. Reiner has stated that police authorities 'play
the piper but never name the tune' (Reiner, 2010).
The Proposed Changes
One of the primary objectives of the proposed reforms is to increase understanding and participation in
policing by reconnecting the public with the police (Home Office, 2010a). Under the new revised system, the
Police Authority will be replaced within the tripartite system to include instead a Police and Crime
Commissioner for each police force excluding London (Home Office, 2010b). The consultation paper uses
the terminology and describes the role of the Police and Crime Commissioners as a 'mission to fight crime
and anti-social behaviour' (Home Office, 2010b). Therefore it appears that the Commissioner will be
responsible for:
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· Holding the chief officer to account by ensuring the priorities set by the wider public are
achieved. It will be for the Commissioner to ensure that maximum efficiency, effectiveness and
economic viability is attained;
· Identifying, engaging and representing local communities within the force area;
· Setting the policing budgets and precept (the proportion of council tax that is spent on
policing);
· Appointing the Chief Constable;
· And where necessary dismissing the Chief Constable.
Although the role of the Commissioners is similar to the responsibilities of the police authorities as previously
explored, one of the significant differences is that the Commissioner will have the power to dismiss chief
officers. This appears to shift and redistribute power within the tripartite system, which it is claimed will result
in a fairer and more accountable arrangement. It is anticipated that the introduction of directly elected
Commissioners will stimulate engagement and raise awareness by becoming more transparent and
ultimately more accountable and accessible to the public. Among the more concerning aspects of the
proposals is the projected cost of implementing the reforms.
Economic Implications of Change
In times of economic hardship and flat economic growth, the financial implications of introducing Crime
Commissioners will be significant (Audit Commission, 2010; Gravelle & Rogers, 2010b). If the government
continued under the previous arrangement to keep police authorities, it is believed that the current system
would cost between 0.5% and 0.75% of the police budget and precept to maintain all police authorities
across England and Wales (Home Office, 2010c). In 2010/11 costs, this would equate to £52-£78 million.
The government estimates that the single one-off costs associated with introducing the Commissioners
would be £5 million. However, in addition to this cost, there would be additional annual running costs, which
are outlined below.
Table 2 Potential annual costs
Description of cost Total annual expenditure
(£m)
Police and Crime Commissioner
Salary and benefits
5
Police and Crime Commissioner sup-
port
36.9-63
Police Crime Commissioner Panels 2
Chief Executive Officer salary and be-
nefits
7.9
Elections (held every four years
@£50m)
12.5
Total 64.3-90.4
Source: adapted from Home Office (2010a).
The Crime Commissioners would each receive an annual salary of £122,000, with a total expenditure for all
41 Commissioners of £5 million per annum. In addition to this cost, the support team functions would need to
be considered. Representing large numbers of people within their constituencies, the Commissioner will
need operational support and this cost is estimated to reach between £36.9 million and £63 million. The
panel overseeing the Commissioners would cost an additional £2 million per annum and would be
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responsible for holding the Commissioner to account and protecting the interests of the police. The
government also predicts that it will be necessary to have two statutory posts in place within each force area.
These posts would include a head of paid staff and financial officer posts. It is estimated to cost £7.9 million
in salaries and bonuses. The final associated cost of introducing Commissioners would be the cost of
elections. For the purposes of calculating the annual running cost of the system, the election cost of £50
million every four years has been divided into four, resulting in a total annual running cost in 2010/11 cost
equivalence of £64.3-£90.4 million, which is more than the economic cost of running the police authorities
under the current tripartite system.
Potential Risks of Change
Writing in 1993, Loveday (1993) identified that Police Authorities should reflect local needs and priorities
informed by a consultation process. It would appear that this concept has been found wanting. Clearly, there
are also serious issues and concerns that exist around the issue of introducing directly elected
Commissioners. Logistical considerations of how accountability will be delivered to large numbers of
constituents by only one Commissioner will need to be considered. If the introduction of Police Crime
Commissioners were conceptualised in an effort to inspire localism, potential complications then arise
whereby it may be impractical for one individual to represent up to 500,000 individual constituents. In
research conducted by Loveday (2006), the argument was made that local Basic Command Units (BCUs)
should be responsible for delivering neighbourhood policing and community policing, with other national
agencies responsible for providing specialist services. Under this system, more localised accountability from
BCU level may have the capacity to deliver increased levels of accountably. Officials, including local
politicians, mayors, council leaders or a specially elected commissioner could hold BCU police commanders
to account with the ability under certain circumstances to dismiss officers, thus strengthening local
mechanisms of control and liability. Although the government has in some way addressed this by budgeting
for operational support for Commissioners, provision will need to be made for access. The location of offices
and other venues of the Commissioners within each force will also be an issue. Many living or working some
distance away from these places may find access to their services difficult. Indeed, the size of each
community Commissioners represent will also differ. Budgets, number of police officers, geographical land
mass and the number of inhabitants will each differ and it is likely that there will be little uniformity for
Commissioners, opening the debate on how local Commissioners will have the capacity to deliver local
priorities (North Yorkshire Police Authority, 2010).
As crime has been falling to an historic low, many will perhaps wonder why a seemingly 'winning'
combination under the tripartite system would not be needed (Flatley et al., 2010). Unmistakably, this reform
is likely to further politicise policing. It is feared that local members of the public will simply not have a strong
enough local profile over the entire force area to campaign and get elected against political candidates put
up by the major political parties such as Labour, Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats.
In addition to this concern, the possible relationship between Police Crime Commissioners and partner
agencies, including Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs), also seems unclear. As the legislation currently
stands, there is no obligation for the Police and Crime Commissioners to work with statutory partners on
issues of crime and justice (Chambers, 2009). With the 'big society' being held up as the gold standard,
provision for cross-agency collaboration surely needs to be re-examined (Gravelle & Rogers, 2010a).
Operational Difficulties and Weaknesses
Similarly, closer scrutiny and deliberation will also be needed around the issue of 'operational independence',
with concerns being raised by many stakeholder groups, not least from police authorities and police chiefs
(Home Affairs Select Committee, 2010). It has long been the case in England and Wales that police chiefs
have autonomy in the way in which they direct resources and make operational decisions. The consultation
paper clearly states, however, that this principle of operational independence is fundamental to British
policing and the government will take every action to ensure this is maintained under the reforms (Beare &
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Murray, 2007). This must then be a matter that needs to be resolved prior to introducing the Crime
Commissioners, and will unquestionably be a point in which consensus must be reached for the proposals to
progress. This will be needed to ensure that Commissioners will be aware of the boundaries in directing chief
police officers to carry out specific actions. It is likely that this will need to be defined prior to the introduction
of Police Crime Commissioners. In a recent conference held in London, the chairman of the Home Affairs
Select Committee, Keith Vaz MP, stated that he would ask that this be legislated in a memorandum of
agreement (Vaz, 2011). The panel overseeing each Commissioner will also need perhaps to put in place
some much-needed checks and balances so as to ensure that too much power is not put into the hands of
one elected official (North Yorkshire Police Authority, 2010).
This has highlighted another potential issue that will need to be carefully considered as the legislation is
drafted. It has been established that the panel overseeing the Police Crime Commissioners will have the
power of veto over the appointment of a Chief Constable but will need a three-quarter majority (Home Office,
2010b). Despite this, they cannot, however, reject the sacking of a Chief Constable as this will be a matter
for the Commissioner alone. This surely will need to be carefully thought through. Again, this power of veto
and issues around autonomy with limited checks and balances will need to be amended as the bill
progresses through both Houses of Parliament in Westminster.
Public Influence and Expectation
It is likely that although public spending will certainly be reduced, public expectation is unlikely to follow the
same trend, but instead may remain constant or even increase. Reasons for this may partly be as a result of
the 'consumer' and 'individualistic' society that has developed over recent years, with this ideology increasing
pressure on public sector organisations, including the police, to continue to provide increasingly better quality
of services (Samli, 1995). This public expectation may also increase following the introduction of Police
Crime Commissioners as candidates for the elected office stand on undeliverable manifestos, unrealistically
over-promising and consequently under-delivering. If this becomes the case then it is likely to do very little to
improve the relationship between the police and public.
Finally, concerns highlighted over the proposals include eligibility of candidates to stand for the post of
Commissioner, with apprehension being expressed over extremist political parties such as the British
National Party (BNP) or the English Defence League seeking candidacy. Research carried out by Button and
Loveday (2010) into proposals to create an elected office to the CSPs raised similar issues, with
apprehension over extremist or single-issue candidates being elected to office. Elected candidates may
express extreme right-wing agendas or be fixed on tackling single issues such as anti-speeding campaigns.
Additionally, candidates may target certain sectors of communities such as travellers, young people or
individuals from ethnic minority groups. Former police officers are disqualified from standing for the position
of Commissioner for four years following retirement. Indeed, the policy surrounding individuals who have or
have had criminal convictions to be eligible to stand would also need to be examined (Home Office, 2010b).
Low turnout may amplify theses issues as the police and Commissioners together attempt to re-engage with
communities.
Accountability
Given the economic projections of implementing Crime Commissioners, it therefore appears that
accountability, accountability and more accountability is to be paramount to the successful implementation of
the Crime Commissioners as communities are empowered to engage directly and easily with the police and
influence the delivery of policing services (Punch, 2009). With a focus on 'bottom up' accountably from
communities, Commissioners, police and politicians, along with a side-ways accountability from police to
statutory and volunteer partners of the 'big society', the proposed reforms may be successful (Eaton, 2010;
Cabinet Office, 2010).
With a drive for cohesion, efficacy and improving social trust in communities, it will be for the police,
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Commissioners and public to work together and create a productive and stimulating environment, drawing on
creativity and experience to solve goals identified in a changing environment (Gravelle & Rogers, 2009). It is
likely that the 'single point of contact' offered by the Commissioner will be favourable with the public as it may
leave a sense of access and empowerment; however, the detail of how this will be achieved needs to be
further considered throughout the consultation process. To overcome the democratic deficit successfully,
Commissioners will need to ensure they are representative of all the different communities.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the aim of electing Commissioners in 2012, due to government slight postponement, appears
at first glance to be to make the current system more democratic and for that reason seems to encourage
transparency and accountability, which has apparently been a weakness of the current tripartite model
operating across England and Wales. It means that police chiefs will have to interact and work closely with
Commissioners as they establish their new powers and responsibilities. Further repercussions such as the
implications for the statutory and volunteer partners of the police must also be considered if maximum
efficiency is to be delivered, especially in times of economic uncertainty. If implemented correctly, designing
out political party infighting may be an advantage overlooked by many. However, accountability must be at
the centre of any reform introduced within this area. In addition, encouraging collaboration between
Commissioners, especially on global and national issues such as terrorism, the fast-approaching Olympic
events and on issues surrounding wider efficiency savings, such as the procurement of resources, must be
well thought out. Reducing bureaucracy, providing a joined-up service, increasing public involvement and
promoting democratic accountability will arguably be the criteria and measures of success of the new
scheme as England and Wales move slowly towards an elected model of policing. Clearly, whatever the
outcome of the consultation process, it will be imperative that the knowledge and experience built up by the
police authorities whilst carrying out their duties of holding the police to account are retained and passed on
to their successor.
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